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Since the outbreak of fighting in 2003, international attention has been drawn to the conflict in 
Darfur. UN Security Council Resolution 1769 of 31 July 2007 established the joint United Na-
tions and African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
The full deployment of UNAMID has so far been delayed because of obstructions by the Sudan-
ese government and lacking international contributions. The main reasons for scepticism con-
cerning UNAMID’s success are the challenges in command and control that might originate 
from a mission being authorised and commanded by an international organisation while being 
carried out by a regional body, and the force’s lack of capabilities. It is questionable, therefore, 
whether the international presence in Darfur will be able to fulfil its mandate to protect civil-
ians. Henri Boshoff, a Military Analyst for the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in Tshwane 
(Pretoria), South Africa, was a speaker at the Potsdam Spring Dialogues 2008 on “Shared Re-
sponsibility to Protect? Global and Regional Approaches to Peacekeeping in Africa” that took 
place on 4-5 April 2008. 
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”Without the deployment of foreign troops and 
adequate capabilities, the mission will not succeed”  
 
The international community and the people of Darfur were very happy when the United Na-
tions Security Council on 31 July 2007 approved Resolution 1769 authorising the deployment of 
26,0000 soldiers and police to Darfur as part of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Mis-
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sion to Darfur (UNAMID). The aim of the resolution, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of 
the United Nations, is to  
“support early and effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, prevent the disrup-
tion of its implementation and armed attacks, and protect civilians, without prejudice to the re-
sponsibility of the Government of Sudan” (paragraph 15.a.ii). 
The United Nations in the same mandate also authorised the deployment of up to 19,555 mili-
tary personnel, including 360 military observers and liaison officers, a civilian component in-
cluding 3,772 policemen and 19 formed police units (140 policemen in each unit). The mandate 
also put emphasis on the availability of a “Heavy Support Package”, comprising enablers such 
as helicopters, aircraft, Special Forces and Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) to ensure that 
the mission has got the capability to execute its mandate.  
Since July 2007, the international debate focuses on UNAMID’s mandate and its capability to 
execute the mission. Various remarks were made by the Government of Sudan as to Resolution 
1769 e.g. by General Rahamah, the officer in charge of international relations at the Sudanese 
Defense Ministry. He maintained that the military personnel in the UN/AU hybrid operation 
does not have the right to protect civilians. He further said that this force has the right to act un-
der Chapter VII only in the case of self-defence. This was but one of the remarks by the Govern-
ment of Sudan. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said in an interview on 5 December 2007 
with Associated Press editors that he was “deeply concerned and disappointed by this foot-
dragging of the Sudanese government” in reaching a final agreement that could make sure that 
the force can be deployed in Darfur in January 2008. He said he was also concerned about the 
lack of support from European countries and well-equipped developing countries. 
China and Sudan made sure that the UN mandate was crucially limited 
The mandate as approved by the United Nations Security Council on 31 July 2007 is key to the 
successful implementation of the UN/AU-Hybrid Mission in Darfur. The most important para-
graph, the centre of gravity of the mandate is paragraph 15.a.ii that aims at preventing the dis-
ruption of armed attacks and protecting civilians. It was difficult to get the approval of all per-
manent member states of the United Nations Security Council. China, in particular, played a 
major role influencing the drafting of the mandate, supporting Khartoum’s insistence that the 
mandate of the deploying hybrid force be crucially limited. Sudan made sure that any peace-
keeping force will not be allowed to disarm those combatants using weapons introduced into 
the Darfur theatre in violation of previous UN Security Council resolutions, even if these com-
batants are threatening to attack civilians. Here we should recall that UN Security Council Reso-
lution 1706 of 31 August 2006 explicitly authorized that the proposed force be able  
“to seize or collect, as appropriate, arms or related materials whose presence in Darfur is in 
violation of the Agreements and the measures imposed by paragraphs 7 and 8 of Resolution 
1556, and to dispose of such arms and related material as appropriate” (paragraph 12.a). 
A year has passed since the United Nations Security Council has passed Resolution 1769 and 
only one third of the troops are deployed. UNAMID is expecting the mission to be in place in 
January 2009. So far, however, the United Nations have added only a few hundred additional 
troops of the 19,555 authorized to deploy. Material such as transport and attack helicopters also 
has not yet arrived at the mission. 
The AU has a history of not being able to provide forces 
One of the major challenges to the mission is the make-up of the “hybrid” UN/AU force, par-
ticularly the insistence by both Khartoum and the African Union that there are more than 
enough contributions from African nations and that contributions from non-African nations 
(such as Thailand, Uruguay, and Norway) are unnecessary. The AU, however, has a history of 
not being able to provide forces for AU missions, e.g. in Burundi and Somalia. Moreover, Jean-
Marie Guéhenno, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, earlier point-
ed to the fact that the force still needs specialized helicopter, transport and logistical units. Afri-
can countries (with the exception of a few countries) do not have these capabilities. Roméo Dal-
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laire, UN Force Commander in Rwanda during the genocide, has also been explicit about this 
challenge:  
“It is beyond dispute that African states themselves simply cannot provide nearly 20,000 quali-
fied troops (nor enough police). UNAMID needs attack helicopters, engineers, big cargo lorries, 
communications and other capabilities that African states also cannot provide.”  
Who is in charge? 
Another challenge is the issue of command and control. The precise chain of command and con-
trol for the UNAMID force has been consistently finessed at the UN, mainly to avoid a confron-
tation with the African Union, which insists that it must head the chain of command for the hy-
brid force. UN Resolution 1769 however states that there will be a unity of command and con-
trol in accordance with basic principles of peacekeeping, which means a single chain of com-
mand and control structure that will be provided by the United Nations. The question could 
thus be asked who is in charge? Where does the authority of the UNAMID Force Commander, 
General Martin Luther Agwai, end? And where does the authority of the UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) begin? Does General Agwai report to Addis Ababa or New 
York? To whom does he turn for support in his decision-making? These questions have not 
been answered yet. 
It is clear, however, that the underlying challenge to the hybrid force is the sovereignty of the 
Sudanese state. The UN and the international community must find a way around this obstacle. 
The attack on UNAMID peacekeepers on 8 July 2008 in which seven peacekeepers were killed 
and 22 wounded again emphasises that without the deployment of foreign troops and adequate 
capabilities the mission will not succeed. 
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